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Abstract: Current network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) lack the adaptability to the frequently changing 
network environments. Furthermore, intrusion detection in the new distributed architectures is now a major 
requirement. In this paper, we propose two online Adaboost-based intrusion detection algorithms. In the first 
algorithm, a traditional online Adaboost process is used where decision stumps are used as weak classifiers. In 
the second algorithm, an improved online Adaboost process is proposed, and online GMMs are used as weak 
classifiers. We further propose a distributed intrusion detection framework, in which a local parameterized 
detection model is constructed in each node using the online Adaboost algorithm. A global detection model is 
constructed in each node by combining the local parametric models using a small number of samples in the node. 
This combination is achieved using an algorithm based on particle swarm optimization (PSO) and support vector 
machines (SVM). The global model in each node is used to detect intrusions. Experimental results show that the 
improved online Adaboost process with GMMs obtains a higher detection rate and a lower false alarm rate than 
the traditional online Adaboost process which uses decision stumps. Both the algorithms outperform existing 
intrusion detection algorithms. It is also shown that our PSO and SVM-based algorithm effectively combines the 
local detection models into the global model in each node: the global model in a node can handle the intrusion 
types which are found in other nodes, without sharing the samples of these intrusion types. 
Index terms: Network intrusions, Dynamic distributed detection, Online Adaboost learning, Parameterized 
model 
1. Introduction 
Network attack detection is one of the most important problems in network information security. Currently 
there are mainly firewall, NIDS/NIPS (network-based intrusion detection and prevention systems) and UTM 
(unified threat management) like devices to detect attacks in network infrastructure. NIDS/NIPS detect and 
prevent network behaviors which violate or endanger network security. Basically, firewalls are used to block 
certain types of traffic to improve the security. NIDS and firewalls can be linked to block network attacks. UTM 
devices combine firewall, NIDS/NIPS and other capabilities onto a single device to detect similar events as 
standalone firewalls and NIDS/NIPS devices. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) [52] adds analysis on the application 
layer, and then recognizes various applications and their contents. DPI can incorporate NIDS into firewalls. It 
can increase the accuracy of intrusion detection, but it is more time-consuming, in contrast to traditional package 
header analysis. This paper focuses on investigation of NIDS. 
The current practical solutions for NIDS used in industry are misuse-based methods which utilize signatures 
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of attacks to detect intrusions by modeling each type of attack. As typical misuse detection methods, pattern 
matching methods search packages for the attack features by utilizing protocol rules and string matching. Pattern 
matching methods can effectively detect the well-known intrusions. But they rely on the timely generation of 
attack signatures, and fail to detect novel and unknown attacks. In the case of rapid proliferation of novel and 
unknown attacks, any defense based on signatures of known attacks becomes impossible. Moreover, the 
increasing diversity of attacks obstructs modeling signatures. 
Machine learning deals with automatically inferring and generalizing dependencies from data to allow 
extrapolation of dependencies to unseen data. Machine learning methods for intrusion detection model both 
attack data and normal network data, and allow for detection of unknown attacks using the network features [60]. 
This paper focuses on machine learning-based NIDS. The machine learning-based intrusion detection methods 
can be classified as statistics-based, data mining-based, and classification-based. All the three classes of methods 
first extract low level features and then learn rules or models which are used to detect intrusions. A brief review 
of each class of methods is given below. 
1) Statistics-based methods construct statistical models of network connections to determine whether a new 
connection is an attack. For instance, Denning [1] construct statistical profiles for normal behaviors. The profiles 
are used to detect anomalous behaviors which are treated as attacks. Caberera et al. [2] adopt the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to compare observation network signals with normal behavior signals, assuming that 
the number of observed events in a time segment obeys the Poisson distribution. Li and Manikopoulos [22] 
extract several representative parameters of network flows, and model these parameters using a hyperbolic 
distribution. Peng et al. [23] use a nonparametric cumulative sum algorithm to analyze the statistics of network 
data, and further detect anomalies on the network. 
2) Data mining-based methods mine rules which are used to determine whether a new connection is an 
attack. For instance, Lee et al. [3] characterize normal network behaviors using association rules and frequent 
episode rules [24]. Deviations from these rules indicate intrusions on the network. Zhang et al. [40] use the 
random forest algorithm to automatically build patterns of attacks. Otey et al. [4] propose an algorithm for 
mining frequent itemsets (groups of attribute value pairs) to combine categorical and continuous attributes of 
data. The algorithm is extended to handle dynamic and streaming data sets. Zanero and Savaresi [25] first use 
unsupervised clustering to reduce the network packet payload to a tractable size, and then a traditional anomaly 
detection algorithm is applied to intrusion detection. Mabu et al. [49] detect intrusions by mining fuzzy class 
association rules using genetic network programming. Panigrahi and Sural [51] detect intrusions using fuzzy 
logic, which combines evidence from a user’s current and past behaviors. 
3) Classification-based methods construct a classifier which is used to classify new connections as either 
attacks or normal connections. For instance, Mukkamala et al. [30] use the support vector machine (SVM) to 
distinguish between normal network behaviors and attacks, and further identify important features for intrusion 
detection. Mill and Inoue [31] propose the TreeSVM and ArraySVM algorithms for reducing the inefficiencies 
which arise when a sequential minimal optimization algorithm for intrusion detection is learnt from a large set of 
training data. Zhang and Shen [7] use SVMs to implement online intrusion detection. Kayacik et al. [5] propose 
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an algorithm for intrusion detection based on the Kohonen self organizing feature map (SOM). Specific attention 
is given to a direct labeling of SOM nodes with the connection type. Bivens et al. [26] propose an intrusion 
detection method in which SOMs are used for data clustering and multi-layer perceptron (MLP) neural networks 
are used for detection. Hierarchical neural networks [28], evolutionary neural networks [29], and MLP neural 
networks [27], have been applied to distinguish between attacks and normal network behaviors. Hu and 
Heywood [6] combine SVM with SOM to detect network intrusions. Khor et al. [55] propose a dichotomization 
algorithm in which rare categories are separated from the training data and cascaded classifiers are trained to 
handle both the rare categories and other categories. Xian et al. [32] combine the fuzzy K-means algorithm with 
the clonal selection algorithm to detect intrusions. Jiang et al. [33] use an incremental version of the K-means 
algorithm to detect intrusions. Hoglund et al. [34] extract features describing network behaviors from audit data, 
and use the SOM to detect intrusions. Sarasamma et al. [18] propose a hierarchical SOM which selects different 
feature subset combinations that are used in different layers of the SOM to detect intrusions. Song et al. [35] 
propose a hierarchical random subset selection-dynamic subset selection (RSS-DSS) algorithm to detect 
intrusions. Lee et al. [8] propose an adaptive intrusion detection algorithm which combines the adaptive 
resonance theory with the concept vector and the Mecer-Kernel. Jirapummin et al. [21] employ a hybrid neural 
network model to detect TCP SYN flooding and port scan attacks. Eskin et al. [20] use a k-nearest neighbor 
(k-NN)-based algorithm and a SVM-based algorithm to detect anomalies. 
Although there is much work on intrusion detection, several issues are still open and require further 
research, for example: 
 Network environments and the intrusion training data change rapidly over time, as new types of attack 
emerge. In addition, the size of the training data increases over time and can become very large. Most 
existing algorithms for training intrusion detectors are offline. The intrusion detector must be retrained 
periodically in batch mode in order to keep up with the changes in the network. This retraining is time 
consuming. Online training is more suitable for dynamic intrusion detectors. New data are used to update 
the detector and are then discarded. The key issue in online training is to maintain the accuracy of the 
intrusion detector. 
 There are various types of attributes for network connection data, including both categorical and 
continuous ones, and the value ranges for different attributes differ greatly — from {0, 1} to describe the 
normal or error status of a connection, to [0, 107] to specify the number of data bytes sent from source to 
destination. The combination of data with different attributes without loss of information is crucial to 
maintain the accuracy of intrusion detectors. 
 In traditional centralized intrusion detection, in which all the network data are sent to a central site for 
processing, the raw data communications occupy considerable network bandwidth. There is a 
computational burden in the central site and the privacy of the data obtained from the local nodes cannot 
be protected. Distributed detection [36], which shares local intrusion detection models learned in local 
nodes, can reduce data communications, distribute the computational burden, and protect privacy. Otey 
et al. [4] construct a novel distributed algorithm for detecting outliers (including network intrusions). Its 
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limitation is that many raw network data still need to be shared among distributed nodes. There is a 
requirement for a distributed intrusion detection algorithm to make only a small number of 
communications between local nodes. 
In this paper, we address the above challenges, and propose a classification-based framework for the 
dynamic distributed network intrusion detection using the online Adaboost algorithm [58]. The Adaboost 
algorithm is one of the most popular machine learning algorithms. Its theoretical basis is sound, and its 
implementation is simple. Moreover, the AdaBoost algorithm corrects the misclassifications made by weak 
classifiers and it is less susceptible to over-fitting than most learning algorithms. Recognition performances 
of the Adaboost-based classifiers are generally encouraging. In our framework, a hybrid of online weak 
classifiers and an online Adaboost process results in a parameterized local model at each node for intrusion 
detection. The parametric models for all the nodes are combined into a global intrusion detector in each 
node using a small number of samples, and the combination is achieved using an algorithm based on 
particle swarm optimization (PSO) and SVMs. The global model in a node can handle the attack types 
which are found in other nodes, without sharing the samples of these attack types. Our framework is 
original in the following ways: 
 In the Adaboost classifier, the weak classifiers are constructed for each individual feature 
component, both for continuous and categorical ones, in such a way that the relations between these 
features can be naturally handled, without any forced conversions between continuous features and 
categorical features. 
 New algorithms are designed for local intrusion detection. The traditional online Adaboost process 
and a newly proposed online Adaboost process are applied, to construct local intrusion detectors. 
The weak classifiers used by the traditional Adaboost process are decision stumps. The new 
Adaboost process uses online Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM) as weak classifiers. In both cases 
the local intrusion detectors can be updated online. The parameters in the weak classifiers and the 
strong classifier construct a parametric local model. 
 The local parametric models for intrusion detection are shared between the nodes of the network. 
The volume of communications is very small and it is not necessary to share the private raw data 
from which the local models are learnt. 
 We propose a PSO and SVM-based algorithm for combining the local models into a global detector 
in each node. The global detector which obtains information from other nodes obtains more 
accurate detection results than the local detector. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the distributed intrusion detection 
framework. Section 3 describes the online Adaboost-based local intrusion detection models. Section 4 presents 
the method for constructing the global detection models. Section 5 shows the experimental results. Section 6 
summarizes the paper. 
2. Overview of Our Framework 
In the distributed intrusion detection framework, each node independently constructs its own local intrusion 
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detection model according to its own data. By combining all the local models, at each node, a global model is 
trained using a small number of the samples in the node, without sharing any of the original training data 
between nodes. The global model is used to detect intrusions at the node. Fig. 1 gives an overview of our 
framework which consists of the modules of data preprocessing, local models, and global models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Overview of the intrusion detection framework 
 
1) Data preprocessing: For each network connection, three groups of features [9] which are commonly 
used for intrusion detection are extracted: basic features of individual TCP (transmission control protocol) 
connections, content features within a connection suggested by domain knowledge, and traffic features computed 
using a two-second time window [14]. The extracted feature values from a network connection form a vector x = 
(x1, x2, …,  xD), where D is the number of feature components. There are continuous and categorical features, 
and the value ranges of the features may differ greatly from each other. The framework for constructing these 
features can be found in [9]. A set of data is labeled for training purposes. There are many types of attacks on the 
Internet. The attack samples are labeled as “-1”, “-2”, ... depending on the attack type, and the normal samples 
are all labeled as “+1”. 
2) Local models: The construction of a local detection model at each node includes the design of weak 
classifiers and Adaboost-based training. Each individual feature component corresponds to a weak classifier. In 
this way, the mixed attribute data for the network connections can be handled naturally, and full use can be made 
of the information in each feature. The Adaboost training is implemented using only the local training samples at 
each node. After training, each node contains a parametric model which consists of the parameters of the weak 
classifiers and the ensemble weights.  
3) Global models: By sharing all the local parametric models, a global model is constructed using the PSO 
and SVM-based algorithm in each node. The global model in each node fuses the information learned from all 
the local nodes using a small number of training samples in the node. Feature vectors of new network 
connections to the node are input to the global classifier, and classified as either normal or attacks. The results of 
the global model in the node are used to update the local model in the node and the updated model is then shared 
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by other nodes. 
3. Local Detection Models 
The classical Adaboost algorithm [37] carries out the training task in batch mode. A number of weak 
classifiers are constructed using a training set. Weights, which indicate the importance of the training samples, 
are derived from the classification errors of the weak classifiers. The final strong classifier is an ensemble of 
weak classifiers. The classification error of the final strong classifier converges to 0. However, the Adaboost 
algorithm based on offline learning is not suitable for networks. We apply online versions of Adaboost to 
construct the local intrusion detection models. It is proved in [38] that the strong classifier obtained by the online 
Adaboost converges to the strong classifier obtained by the offline Adaboost as the number of training samples 
increases. 
In the following, we first introduce the weak classifiers for intrusion detection, and then describe the online 
Adaboost-based intrusion detection algorithms. 
3.1. Weak classifiers 
Weak classifiers which can be updated online match the requirement of dynamic intrusion detection. We 
consider two types of weak classifier. The first type consists of decision stumps for classifying attacks and 
normal behaviors. The second type consists of online GMMs which model a distribution of values of each 
feature component for each attack type. 
3.1.1. Decision stumps 
A decision stump is a decision tree with a root node and two leaf nodes. A decision stump is constructed for 
each feature component of the network connection data. 
For a categorical feature f, the set of attribute values 
fC  is divided into two subsets fiC  and 
f
nC  with 
no intersection, and the decision stump takes the form: 
1
( )
1
f
f n
f f
f i
x C
h x
x C
 
 
 
                                   (1) 
where fx  is the attribute value of x on the feature f. The subsets 
f
iC  and 
f
nC  are determined using the 
training samples: for an attribute value z on a feature f, all the training samples whose attribute values on f are 
equal to z are found; if the number of attack samples in these samples is more than the number of normal 
samples, then z is assigned to 
f
iC , otherwise, z is assigned to 
f
nC . In this way, the false alarm rate for the 
training samples is minimized. 
For a continuous feature f, the range of attribute values is split by a threshold v, and the decision stump 
takes the form: 
1
( )
1
f
f
f
x v
h x
x v

 
 
.                                  (2) 
The threshold v is determined by minimizing the false alarm rate for the training samples. 
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The above design of weak classifiers for intrusion detection has the following advantages: 
 The decision stumps operate on individual feature components. This first deals naturally with 
combination of information from categorical attributes and from continuous attributes, and second deals 
with the large variations in value ranges for the different feature components. 
 There is only one comparison operation in a decision stump. The computation complexity for 
constructing the decision stumps is very low, and online updating of decision stumps can be easily 
implemented when new training samples are obtained. 
The limitation of the above design of weak classifiers is that the decision stumps do not take into account the 
different types of attacks. This may influence the performance of the Adaboost method. 
3.1.2. Online GMM 
For the samples of each attack type or the normal samples, we use a GMM to model the data on each 
feature component. Let  1, 1, 2, ,c M      be a sample label, where “+1” represents the normal 
samples and “-1, -2,…-M” represents different types of attacks where M is the number of attack types. The 
GMM model 
c
j  on the jth feature component for the samples with label c is represented as: 
 
1
( ), ( ), ( )
K
c c c c
j j j j i
i i i   

                             (3) 
where K is the number of GMM components indexed by i, and  ,   and   represent the weight, mean and 
standard deviation for the corresponding component. Then, the weak classifier on the jth feature is constructed 
as: 
1 11 ( | ) ( | ) 1, 2,...,
( )
1
c
j j
j
if p x p x for c M
h x M
otherwise
 

    
 

                 (4) 
where “1/M” is used to weight the probabilities for attack types in order to balance the importance of the attack 
samples and the normal samples. In this way, the sum of the weights for all the types of attack samples is equal 
to the weight of normal samples, and then the false alarm rate is reduced for the final ensemble classifier. 
The traditional way for estimating the parameter vectors 
c
j , using the K-means clustering and the 
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm [41], from the training samples, is time-consuming and is not suitable 
for online learning. In this paper, we use the online EM-based algorithm [44] to estimate these parameters. Given 
a new sample ( , )x y  where x is the feature vector of the sample and {1, 1, 2 }y   , the parameter vectors 
y
j  are updated using the following steps: 
Step 1: Update the number ( )
y
jN i  of the training samples belonging to the ith component of the GMM 
by: 
 
( )
1
( ) ( )
0
y
j
y
i j
x i
if T
x i
else


 

  


                            (5) 
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( ) ( ) ( )y yj j iN i N i x                                (6) 
where the binary function ( )i x  determines whether (x, y) belongs to the ith component, and 
the threshold T depends on confidence limits required. 
      Update ( )yj i  by: 
1
( )
( )
( )
y
jy
j K
y
j
k
N i
i
N k




.                                 (7) 
Step 2: Calculate the following equation: 
1
( ) ( | ( ), ( )) ( )
K
y y y
j j j i
i
i p x i i x  

  .                        (8) 
where  describes the relation between (x, y) and the GMM of 
y
j . 
If 0 , then go to Step 3; else ( 0  means that there is no relation between (x, y) and the 
GMM of 
y
j ), go to Step 5 for setting a new Gaussian component for (x, y). 
Step 3: Update the sum ( )yjA i  of the weighted probabilities for all the input training samples belonging 
to the ith component by: 
( ) ( ) ( | ( ), ( )) ( ) /y y yj j j ii i p x i i x                           (9) 
( ) ( ) ( )y yj jA i A i i                                (10) 
where ( )i  is the probability that (x, y) belongs to the ith component of the GMM. 
Step 4: Update ( )yj i  and ( )
y
j i  by: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
y
jy y
j jy y
j j
A i i i
i i x
A i A i
 
 

                          (11) 
2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ( ))
( ) ( )
y y
j jy y y
j j jy y
j j
A i i A i i i
i i x i
A i A i
  
  
 
   .            (12) 
 Exit. 
Step 5: Reset a Gaussian component t in y
j  by: 
arg min( ( ))yj
i
t i                                  (13) 
( ) ( ) 1
( ) ( ) 1
y y
j j
y y
j j
N t N t
A t A t
  

 
                                (14) 
( )
( )
y
j
y
j
t x
t

 
 


.                                    (15) 
           where   is used to initialize the standard deviation of the component t. 
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The terms ( ) / ( )yji A i  in (11) and ( ( ) ( )) ( ) / ( )
y y
j jA i i i A i   in (12) are the learning rates of the algorithm. 
They are changed dynamically: getting smaller with the growth of the training samples. This behavior of the 
learning rates ensures that the online EM algorithm achieves the balance between the stability needed to keep the 
characteristics of the model learned from the previous samples and necessity of adapting the model as new 
samples are received. 
The computational complexity of the online GMM for one sample is ( )O K . While the online GMM, 
which can be used to model distributions of each type of attack, has a higher complexity than decision stumps, 
the complexity for the online GMM is still very low as K is a small integer. So, the online GMM is suitable in 
online environments. 
3.2. Online ensemble learning 
To adapt to online training in which each training sample is used only once for learning the strong classifier, 
online Adboost makes the following changes to the offline Adaboost: 
● All the weak classifiers are initialized. 
● Once a sample is input, a number of weak classifiers are updated using this sample, and the weight of this 
sample is changed according to certain criteria such as the weighted false classification rate of the weak 
classifiers. 
In the following, we first apply the traditional online Adaboost algorithm to intrusion detection, and then we 
propose a new and more effective online Adaboost algorithm. 
3.2.1. Traditional online Adaboost 
Oza [38] proposes an online version of Adaboost, and gives a convergence proof. This online Adaboost 
algorithm has been applied to the computer vision field [42]. When a new sample is input to the online Adaboost 
algorithm, all the weak classifiers (ensemble members) are updated in the same order [10]. Let 1,...,{ }t t Dh   be 
the weak classifiers. This online Adaboost algorithm is outlined as follows: 
Step 1: Initialize the weighted counters 
sc
t  and 
sw
t  of “historical” correct and wrong classification 
results for the t-th weak classifier th  as: 0
sc
t  , 0
sw
t   (t=1, 2, …, D). 
Step 2: For each new sample (x, y) 
Initialize the weight   of the current sample as: 1  . 
For t = 1, 2, …, D 
(a) Randomly sample an integer k from the Poisson distribution: ( )Poisson  . 
(b) Update the weak classifier th  using the sample (x, y) k times 
(c) If the weak classifier th  correctly classifies the sample (x, y), i.e. ( ) ( )th x sign y , 
then 
the weighted correct classification counter 
sc
t  is updated by 
sc sc
t t    ; 
 10 
the approximate weighted false classification rate t  is updated by: 
sw
t
t sc sw
t t


 


                            (16) 
the weight of the sample (x, y) is updated by: 
1
2(1 )t
 

 
  
 
                          (17) 
else 
sw
t  is updated by 
sw sw
t t    ; 
t  is updated using (16); 
the weight of the sample (x, y) is updated by: 
1
2 t
 

 
  
 
.                           (18) 
(d) The weight t  for the weak classifier th  is: 
1
log tt
t



 
  
 
.                          (19) 
The weight t  reflects the importance of feature t for detecting intrusions. 
Step 3: The final strong classifier is defined by: 
1 1
1
( ) ( ) log ( )
D D
t
t t t
t t t
H x sign h x sign h x


 
   
           
  .               (20) 
The differences between the offline Adaboost algorithm and the online Adaboost algorithm are as follows: 
 In the offline Adaboost algorithm, the weak classifiers are constructed in one step using all the training 
samples. In the online Adaboost algorithm, the weak classifiers are updated gradually as the training 
samples are input one by one. 
 In the offline Adaboost algorithm, all the sample weights are updated simultaneously according to the 
classification results of the optimal weak classifier for the samples. In the above online Adaboost 
algorithm, the weight of the current sample changes as the weak classifiers are updated one by one using 
the current sample. 
 In the offline Adaboost algorithm, the weighted classification error for each weak classifier is calculated 
according to its classification results for the whole set of the training samples. In online Adaboost, the 
weighted classification error for each weak classifier is estimated using the weak classifier’s 
classification results only for the samples which have already been input. 
 The number of weak classifiers is not fixed in the offline Adaboost algorithm. In the online Adaboost, 
the number of weak classifiers is fixed, and equal to the dimension of the feature vectors. 
 When only a few training samples have been input, the online ensemble classifier is less accurate than 
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the offline ensemble classifier. As the number of training samples increases, the accuracy of the online 
ensemble classifier gradually increases until it approximates to the accuracy of the offline ensemble 
classifier [43]. 
The limitation of the traditional online Adaboost algorithm is that for each new input sample, all the weak 
classifiers are updated in a predefined order. The accuracy of the ensemble classifier depends on this order. 
There is a tendency to over-fit to the weak classifiers which are updated first. 
3.2.2. A new online Adaboost algorithm 
To deal with the limitation of the traditional online Adaboost, our new online Adaboost algorithm selects a 
number of weak classifiers according to a certain rule and updates them simultaneously for each input training 
sample. Let S   and S   be, respectively, the numbers of the normal and attack samples which have already 
been input. Let   be the number of the samples, each of which is correctly classified by the previous strong 
classifier which has been trained before the sample is input. Let 
sc
t  be the sum of the weights of the input 
samples that are correctly classified by the weak classifier th . Let 
sw
t  be the sum of the weights of the input 
samples that are mistakenly classified by th . Let tC  be the number of the input samples which are correctly 
classified by th . All the parameters S

, S  ,  , sct , 
sw
t , and tC  are initialized to 0. For a new sample 
( , )x y , {1, 1, 2, }y   , the strong classifier is updated online by the following steps: 
Step 1: Update the parameter S   or S   by: 
1 1
1
S S if y
S S else
 
 
   

 
.                           (21) 
Initialize the weight   of the new sample by: 
1( ) /
( ) /
if yS S S
elseS S S


  
  
  

 
                          (22) 
where   follows the change of S

 and S  , in favor of balancing the proportion of the 
normal samples and the attack samples to ensure that the sum of the weights of the attack 
samples equals to the sum of the weights of the normal samples. 
Step 2: Calculate the combined classification rate t  for each weak classifier th  by: 
(1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
sw
t
t t t tsc sw
t t
sign y h x sign y h x

     
 
     

           (23) 
where   is a weight ranging in (0,0.5] . The rate t  combines the “historical” false 
classification rate t  of th  for the samples input previously and the result of th  for the 
current sample (x, y). The rate t  is more effective than t , as it gives th  whose t  is high 
more chance to be updated and then increases the detection rate of th . 
Define min  by: 
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{1,2,... }
min min t
t D
 

                             (24) 
The weak classifiers  
1,...,t t D
h

 are ranked in the ascending order of t  and then the weak 
classifiers are represented by 
1 2
{ , , , }
Dr r r
h h h , {1,2, , }ir D . 
Step 3: The weak classifies whose combined classification rates ri  are not larger than 0.5  are selected 
from 
1 2
{ , , , }
Dr r r
h h h . Each of these selected weak classifiers rih  is updated using (x, y) in the 
following way: 
Compute the number 
iP  of iterations for rih  by: 
( exp( ( min )))i iP Integer P                            (25) 
where   is an attenuation coefficient and P is a predefined maximum number of 
iterations. 
Repeat the following steps (a) and (b) iP  times in order to update rih : 
(a) Online update rih  using (x, y). 
(b) Update the sample weight  , sct , and 
sw
t : 
If ( ) ( )risign y h x , then 
1
1 2
2(1 )
t t
sc sc
ri ri
ri
C C
  

 

  



 

    
  
.                          (26) 
                 (  is decreased ) 
If ( ) risign y h , then 
1 2
2
sw sw
ri ri
ri
  

 

  

  
  
 
.                            (27) 
(  is increased ) 
Step 4: Update tC , 
sc
t  and 
sw
t  for each th  of the weak classifiers whose combined classification 
rates are larger than 0.5 ( 0.5t  ): 
 if ( ) ( )tsign y h x , then 
1t t
sc sc
t t
C C
  
 

 
                             (28) 
else 
sw sw
t t    . 
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Step 5: Update the parameter  : If the current sample is correctly classified by the previous strong 
classifier which has been trained before the current sample (x, y) is input, then 1 . 
Step 6: Construct the strong ensemble classifier: 
         Calculate the ensemble weight 
*
t  of th  by 
* 1log (1 ) logt tt
t
C
  

   
     
  
.                     (29) 
The 
*
t  is normalized to t  by: 
*
*
1
t
t D
i
i






.                                  (30) 
The strong classifier H(x) is defined by: 
1
( ) ( ( ))
D
t t
t
H x sign h x

  .                          (31) 
We explain two points for the above online Adaboost algorithm: 
 The attenuation coefficient   controls the number of weak classifiers which are chosen for further 
updating. When   is very small, iP  is large and all the chosen weak classifiers are updated using the 
new sample. When   is very large, iP  equals 0 if t  is large. As a result, for very large  , only the 
weak classifiers with the small t  are updated. 
 The ensemble weight t , which is calculated from t  and log( / )tC  , is different from the one in 
the traditional Adaboost algorithm. The term log( / )tC   which is called a “contributory factor” 
represents the contribution rate of 
th  to the strong classifier. It can be used to tune the ensemble 
weights to attain better detection performance. 
3.3. Adaptable initial sample weights 
We use the detection rate and the false alarm rate to evaluate the performance of the algorithm for detecting 
network intrusions. It is necessary to pay more attention to the false alarm rate, because in real applications most 
network behaviors are normal. A high false alarm rate wastes resources, as each alarm has to be checked. For 
Adaboost-based learning algorithms, the detection rate and the false alarm rate depend on the initial weights of 
the training samples. So we propose to adjust the initial sample weights in order to balance the detection rate and 
the false alarm rate. We introduce a parameter (0,1)r  for setting the initial weight   of each training 
sample: 
(1 )
normal intrusion
normal
normal intrusion
intrusion
N N
r for normal connections
N
N N
r for network intrusions
N




 
  

.                   (32) 
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where normalN  and intrusionN  are approximated using the numbers of normal samples and attack samples 
which have been input online to train the classifier. The sums of the weights for the normal samples and the 
attack samples are ( )normal intrusionN N r   and ( ) (1 )normal intrusionN N r    respectively. Through adjusting 
the value of the parameter r, we change the importance of normal samples or attack samples in the training 
process, and then make a tradeoff between the detection rate and the false alarm rate of the final detector. The 
selection of r depends on the proportion of the normal samples in the training data, and the requirements for the 
detection rate and the false alarm rate in specific applications. 
3.4. Local parameterized models 
Subsequent to the construction of the weak classifiers and the online Adaboost learning, a local 
parameterized detection model   is formed in each node. The local model consists of the parameters w  of 
the weak classifiers and the parameters d  for constructing the Adaboost strong classifier: { , }w d   . The 
parameters for each decision stump-based weak classifier include the subsets 
f
iC  and 
f
nC  for each 
categorical feature and the thresholds v for each continuous feature. The parameters for each GMM-based weak 
classifier include a set of GMM parameters { | 1,2,..., ;cw j j D    1, 1, 2,...}c    . The parameters of 
the strong classifier for the online Adaboost algorithm include a set of ensemble weights 
{ | 1,2,..., }d t t D    for the weak classifiers. 
The parameters in the decision stump-based weak classifiers depend on the differences between normal 
behaviors and attacks in each component of the feature vectors. The parameters in the GMM-based weak 
classifiers depend on the distributions of the different types of attacks and normal behaviors in each component 
of the feature vectors. The parameters in the strong classifier depend on the significances of individual feature 
components for intrusion detection. The local detection models capture the distribution characteristics of 
observed mixed-attribute data in each node. They can be exchanged between the different nodes. 
Compared with the non-parametric distributed outlier detection algorithm proposed by Otey et al. [4], 
where a large amount of statistics about frequent itemsets need to be shared among the nodes, the parametric 
models are not only concise to be suitable for information sharing, but also very useful to generate global 
intrusion detection models. 
4. Global Detection Models 
The local parametric detection models are shared among all the nodes, and combined in each node to 
produce a global intrusion detector using a small number of samples left in the node (most samples in the node 
are removed, in order to adapt to changing network environments). This global intrusion detector is more 
accurate than the local detectors which may be only adequate for specific attack types, due to the limited training 
data available at each node. 
Kittler et al. [11] develop a common theoretical framework for combining classifiers using the product rule, 
the sum rule, the max rule, the min rule, the median rule, and the majority vote rule. It is shown that the sum rule 
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has a better performance than others. Some researchers fuse multi-classifiers by combine the output results of all 
the classifiers into a vector, and then using a classifier, such as SVM or ANN, to classify the vectors. 
The combination of the local intrusion detection models has two problems. First, there may be large 
performance gaps between the local detection models for different types of attacks, especially for new attack 
types which have not appeared previously. So, the sum rule may not be the best choice for combining the local 
detectors. Second, some of the local models may be similar for a test sample. If the results of the local models 
for the test sample are combined into a vector, the dimension of the vector has to be reduced to choose the best 
combination of the results from local models. 
To solve the above two problems, we combine the particle swarm optimization (PSO) and SVM algorithms, 
in each node, to construct the global detection model. The PSO [12, 13] is a population search algorithm which 
simulates the social behavior of birds flocking. The SVM is a learning algorithm based on the structural risk 
minimization principle from statistical learning theory. It has a good performance even if the set of the training 
samples is small. We use the PSO to search for the optimal local models and the SVM is trained using the 
samples left in a node. Then, the trained SVM is used as the global model in the node. By combining the 
searching ability of the PSO and the learning ability of the SVM for small sample sets, a global detection model 
can be constructed effectively in each node. 
The state of a particle i used in the PSO for one of the A nodes is defined as 1 2( , , , )i AX x x x , 
{0,1}jx  , where “ 1jx  ” means that the j-th local model is chosen, and “ 0jx  ” means the j-th local model 
is not chosen. For each particle, a SVM classifier is constructed. Let L be the number of local detection nodes 
chosen by the particle state iX . For each network connection sample left in the node, a vector 1 2( , , , )Lr r r  
is constructed, where jr  is the result of the j-th chosen local detection model for the sample (corresponding to 
(20) and (31)): 
1
( )
D
j t t
t
r h x

                                      (33) 
where D is the dimension of network connection feature vectors. These results are in the range [-1, 1]. All the 
vectors corresponding to the small number of samples left in the node, together with the attributions (normal 
connections or attacks) of the samples, are used to train the SVM classifier. 
Each particle i has a corresponding fitness value which is evaluated by a fitness model ( )if X . Let 
( )iX  be the detection rate of the trained SVM classifier for particle i, where the detection rate is estimated 
using another set of samples in the node. The fitness value is evaluated as: 
( ) * ( ) (1 ) logi i
A L
f X X
A
  

                               (34) 
where   is a weight ranging between 0 and 1. 
For each particle i, its individual best state 
l
iS  which has the maximum fitness value is updated in the n-th 
PSO iteration using the following equation: 
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, ,if ( )  (S )
l
l i n i n i
i l
i
X f X f
S
S else
 
 

                              (35) 
The global best state 
gS  in all the particles is updated by: 
arg max ( )
l
i
g l
i
S
S f S                                     (36) 
Each particle in the PSO is associated with a velocity which is modified according to its current best state and 
the current best state among all the particles: 
 , 1 , 1 1 , 2 2 ,( ) ( )l gi n i n i i n i nV F wV c S X c S X                           (37) 
where w is the inertia weight which is negatively correlated with the number of iterations; 1c  and 2c  are 
acceleration constants called the learning rates; 1  and 2  are relatively independent random values in the 
range [0,1]; and ()F  is a function which confines the velocity within a reasonable range: 
max
max
( )
V if V V
F V
V else
 
 

.                              (38) 
The states of the particles are evolved using the updated velocity : 
, 1 , , 1i n i n i nX X V   .                                 (39) 
In theory, PSO can find the global optimum after sufficiently many iterations. In practice, a local optimum 
may be obtained, due to an insufficient number of iterations. PSO has a higher probability of reaching the global 
optimum than gradient descent approaches or particle filtering approaches. 
The SVM and PSO-based fusion algorithm is outlined as follows: 
Step 1: Initialization: The particles  ,0 1i iX   are randomly chosen in the particle space, where  is the 
number of particles. ,0
l
i iS X . A SVM classifier is constructed for each particle, and the 
detection rate ,0( )iX  of the SVM classifier is calculated. The fitness value ,0( )if X  is 
calculated using (34). The global best state gS  is estimated using (36). 0n  . 
Step 2: The velocities  , 1 1i n iV    are updated using (37). 
Step 3: The particles’ states  , 1 1i n iX    are evolved using (39). 
Step 4: The SVM classifier is constructed for each particle, and the detection rate , 1( )i nX   is calculated. 
The fitness values , 1( )i nf X   are calculated using (34). The individual best states   1
l
i i
S

 are 
update using (35). The global best sate 
gS  is updated using (36). 
Step 5: 1n n  . If ( )gf S max_fintness  or the predefined number of iterations is achieved, then 
the particle evolution process terminates and the SVM classifier corresponding to 
gS  is chosen 
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as the final classifier — the global model in the node; otherwise go to Step 2 for another loop of 
evolution. 
When certain conditions are met, nodes may transmit their local models to each other. Then, each node can 
construct a customized global model using a small set of training samples randomly selected from the 
“historical” training samples in the node according to the proportion of various kinds of the network behaviors. 
Once local nodes gain their own global models, the global models are used to detect intrusions: for a new 
network connection, the vector of the results from the local models chosen by the global best particle is used as 
the input to the global model whose result determines whether the current network connection is an attack. 
We explain two points: 
● A uniform global model can be constructed for all the local nodes. But, besides the parameters of local 
models, small sets of samples should be shared through communications between the nodes. 
● The computational complexity of the PSO for searching for the optimal local models determines the 
scale of network for our global model. The computational complexity of the PSO is 
2 2( )O IA   
where I is the number of iterations, and   is the number of the training samples. 
5. Experiments 
We use the KDD (Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining) CUP 1999 dataset [14, 15, 16, 45] to test our 
algorithms. This dataset is still the most trustful and credible public benchmark dataset [53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59] 
for evaluating network intrusion detection algorithms. In the dataset, 41 features including 9 categorical features 
and 32 continuous features are extracted for each network connection. Attacks in the dataset fall into four main 
categories: 
 DOS: denial-of-service; 
 R2L: unauthorized access from a remote machine, e.g. guessing password; 
 U2R: unauthorized access to local super-user (root) privileges; 
 Probe: surveillance and other probing, e.g. port scanning. 
Each of the four categories contains some low-grade attack types. The test dataset includes some attack types 
that do not exist in the training dataset. The numbers of normal connections and each category of attacks in the 
training and test datasets are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. The KDD CUP 1999 data set 
Categories Training data Test data 
Normal 97278 60593 
DOS 391458 223298 
R2L 1126 5993 
U2R 52 39 
Probing 4107 2377 
Others 0 18729 
Total 494021 311029 
 
In the following, we first introduce the performances of our online learning-based intrusion detection 
 18 
algorithms: one with decision stumps and the traditional online Adaboost process, and the other with online 
GMMs and our proposed online Adaboost process. Then, the performance of our PSO and SVM-based 
distributed intrusion detection algorithm is evaluated. 
5.1. Local models 
For the online local models, the ability to handle mixed features, the effects of parameters on detection 
performance, and the ability to learn new types of attacks are estimated in succession. Finally, the performances 
of our algorithms are compared with the published performances of the existing algorithms. 
1) Handling mixed features 
Table 2 shows, respectively, the results of the classifier with decision stumps and the traditional online 
Adaboost and the classifier with online GMMs and our online Adaboost, when only continuous features or both 
continuous features and categorical features are used respectively, tested on the KDD training and test data sets 
respectively. It is seen that the results obtained by using both continuous and categorical features are much more 
accurate than the results obtained by only using continuous features. This shows the ability of our algorithms to 
handle mixed features in network connection data. 
Table 2. The results obtained by using only continuous features or both continuous and categorical features 
Algorithms Features 
Training data Test data 
Detection 
rate 
False alarm 
rate 
Detection 
rate 
False alarm 
rate 
Decision stump + 
Traditional online Adaboost 
Only Continuous 98.68% 8.35% 90.05% 13.76% 
Continuous + Categorical 98.93% 2.37% 91.27% 8.38% 
Online GMM + Our online 
Adaboost 
Only Continuous 98.79% 7.83% 91.33% 11.34% 
Continuous + Categorical 99.02% 2.22% 92.66% 2.67% 
 
2) Effects of parameters on detection performance 
In the following, we illustrate the effects of important parameters, i.e. the adaptable initial weight parameter 
r in (32), the data distribution weight coefficient “1/M” in (4), the parameter   in (23), the parameter   in 
(29), and the attenuation coefficient parameter   in (25). 
Table 3. The results of the algorithm with decision stumps and the traditional online Adaboost when adaptable initial weights are 
used 
r 
Training data Test data 
Detection rate False alarm rate Detection rate False alarm rate 
0.25 98.71% 2.38% 90.83% 8.42% 
0.3 98.69% 0.78% 90.69% 2.29% 
0.35 98.63% 0.77% 89.80% 1.92% 
0.4 98.53% 0.73% 89.66% 1.88% 
0.5 98.16% 0.16% 88.97% 0.37% 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the algorithm with decision stumps and the traditional online Adaboost when 
the adaptable initial weights formulated by (32) are used. When r is increased the detection rate and the false 
alarm rate are decreased. An appropriate setting of r is 0.3, as with this value of r, the false alarm rate of 2.28% 
is much smaller than the false alarm rate of 8.42% obtained by choosing r as 0.25, while an acceptable detection 
rate of 90.69% is still obtained. As shown in Table 2, when an identical initial weight is used for each training 
sample in the traditional online Adaboost algorithm using decision stumps as weak classifiers, a high detection 
 19 
rate of 91.27% is obtained on the test data, but the false alarm rate is 8.38%, which is too high for intrusion 
detection. After adaptable initial weights are introduced, although the detection rate is slightly decreased, the 
false alarm rate is much decreased, producing more suitable results for intrusion detection. This illustrates that 
adjustable initial weights can be used effectively to balance the detection rate and the false alarm rate. 
Table 4 shows the results of the algorithm with online GMMs and our online Adaboost when the data 
distribution weight “1/M” in (4) and adaptable initial weights are used or not used. It is seen that when the 
parameter M is not used, the false alarm rate is 54.15%, which is too high for intrusion detection. When the 
parameter M is used, the false alarm rate falls to 4.82%. When adaptable initial weights are used (r is set to 0.35) 
the false alarm rate further falls to 1.02%, while an acceptable detection rate is maintained. 
Table 4. The results of our online Adaboost algorithm based on online GMMs with or without adaptable initial weights and the data 
distribution weight “1/M” 
Parameters 
Training data Test data 
Detection rate False alarm rate Detection rate False alarm rate 
Without the data distribution 
weight “1/M” 
99.86% 48.85% 97.49% 54.15% 
With “1/M” and without 
adaptable initial weights 
99.22% 8.10% 91.74% 4.82% 
With “1/M” and adaptable 
initial weights 
98.91% 2.65% 90.65% 1.02% 
 
Parameters   in (23) and   in (29) influence the detection results. Table 5 shows the detection rates 
and false-alarm rates of the algorithm with online GMMs and our online Adaboost when 0   or 0.1 and 
1   or 0.8. From this table, the following two points are deduced:  
 When   is set to 0, the false alarm rate is very high. This is because the weak classifiers are chosen 
only according to the false classification rate t , without taking into account the current sample. 
Adopting the measure t  of the combined classification rate balances the effects of “historical” 
samples and the current sample, and then results in more accurate results. 
 When   is set to 1, the detection rate is too low. This is because under this case only t  is used to 
weight the weak classifiers, i.e. every weak classifier is weighted in the same way as in the offline 
Adaboost and the traditional online Adaboost. In the online training process, weighting every weak 
classifier only using t  causes over-fitting to some weak classifiers. Namely, the ensemble weights of 
weak classifiers based only on t  are not accurate. Weighting weak classifiers by combining t  and 
“contributory factors” yields the better performance. 
Table 5. The results of the algorithm with online GMMs and our online Adaboost when 0  or 0.1 and 0.8   or 1 
 Detection rate False alarm rate 
0   0.8   96.22% 77.66% 
0.1  , 1   85.36% 0.60% 
0.1  , 0.8   91.15% 1.69% 
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The attenuation coefficient   in (25) is important for the performance of our online Adaboost algorithm. 
Table 6 shows the detection rates and the false alarm rates of our online Adaboost algorithm based on GMMs, 
when   ranges from 10 to 50. When {20,25,30}  , the updating times Pt is better chosen for the weak 
classifiers and thus good results are obtained. In fact, when   is set to 25, the detection rate reaches 91.15% 
with a false-alarm rate of 1.69%. This is a preferable result compared with those obtained when   is set to 10 
or 50. 
Table 6. The detection results of our online Adaboost algorithm based on online GMMs with varying   
  Detection rate False alarm rate 
10 92.50% 12.87% 
20 90.61% 1.17% 
25 91.15% 1.69% 
30 90.55% 1.26% 
40 88.28% 0.37% 
50 24.33% 0.34% 
 
3) Learning new attack types 
The ability to learn effectively from new types of attacks and then correctly detect these types of attacks is 
an attractive and important characteristic of our online Adaboost-based intrusion detection algorithms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Online learning with decision stumps and the traditional online Adaboost for “guess-passwd” attacks 
 
Figs. 2 and 3 show the online learning process of the ensemble classifier with decision stumps and the 
traditional online Adaboost with respect to two attack types, “guess-passwd” and “httptunnel”, which have not 
appeared before in the training data. In the figures, the horizontal coordinate indicates the number of samples of 
“guess-passwd” or “httptunnel”, which have appeared in the learning process; and the vertical coordinate 
indicates the class label y  predicted by the detector for a sample before it takes part in the learning process, 
where “ 1y  ” means that the sample is mistakenly classified as a normal connection, and “ 1y   ” means that 
it is correctly classified as a network attack. It is seen that at the beginning of learning for new types of attacks, 
the classifier frequently classifies mistakenly samples of these new attack types as normal network connections. 
After some samples of these types of attacks take part in the online learning of the classifier, these new attack 
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types are much more correctly detected. These two examples show the effectiveness of online learning of the 
algorithm with decision stumps and the traditional online Adaboost for new attack types. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Online learning with decision stumps and the traditional online Adaboost for “httptunnel” attacks 
 
Figs. 4 and 5 show the online learning process of the ensemble classifier with online GMMs and our online 
Adaboost for the two attack types, “guess-passwd” and “httptunnel”, which have not appeared before in the 
training data. It is seen that after some samples of “guess-passwd” and “httptunnel” occur in the online learning, 
these two types of samples are then detected much more correctly by the ensemble classifier. Compared with the 
classifier with decision stumps and the traditional online Adaboost, the classifier with online GMMs and our 
online Adaboost learns the new types of attacks more quickly and accurately. This is because the classifier with 
online GMMs and our online Adaboost has more powerful learning ability based on modeling the distributions 
of each type of attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Online learning with online GMMs and our online Adaboost for “guess-passwd” attacks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Online learning with online GMMs and our online Adaboost for “httptunnel” attacks 
 
4) Comparisons 
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We first compare the detection results obtained from part of the labeled KDD CUP 1999 dataset, then the 
results obtained from the whole labeled KDD CUP 1999 dataset. 
Some intrusion detection algorithms are tested on a smaller dataset that contains only three common attack 
types, namely Neptune, Satan, and Portsweep, in order to examine the algorithm’s ability to detect specific types 
of attack. The samples in the dataset are randomly selected from the KDD CUP 1999 data set. Table 7 lists the 
numbers of the training and test samples of all the types in this smaller dataset. Table 8 shows the detection 
results of the algorithm based on hybrid neural networks [21], the algorithm based on the hierarchical SOM [18], 
the algorithm with decision stumps and the traditional online Adaboost, and the algorithm with online GMMs 
and our online Adaboost, all tested on the smaller data set. It is seen that the detection rate of our algorithm with 
decision stumps and the traditional online Adaboost for the specific types of attacks is 99.55%, which is close to 
the highest detection rate for the two algorithms in [18] and [21]. The false alarm rate of this algorithm is only 
0.17%, which is much less than the means in the false alarm rate ranges for the algorithms in [18] and [21]. Our 
algorithm with online GMMs and our online Adaboost even obtains more accurate results. It is shown that our 
online Adaboost-based algorithms are effective for these three types of attacks. 
Table 7. A smaller data set 
Categories Training data Test data 
Normal 20676 60593 
Neptune 22783 58001 
Satan 316 1633 
Portsweep 225 354 
Total 44000 120581 
 
Table 8. The detection results for some specific attacks 
Algorithms Detection rate False alarm rate 
Hybrid neural networks [21] 90%-99.72% 0.06%-4.5% 
Hierarchical SOM [18] 99.17%-99.63% 0.34%-1.41% 
Our algorithm (decision stumps + traditional online Adaboost) 99.55% 0.17% 
Our algorithm (online GMM + our online Adaboost) 99.99% 0.31% 
 
We also compare our online Adaboost-based algorithms with other recently published algorithms for 
intrusion detection. The algorithms are tested on the whole labeled KDD CUP 1999 dataset. Table 9 lists the 
detection results of the following algorithms: the clustering-based algorithm in [3], the k-NN-based algorithm in 
[20], the SVM-based approach in [20], the algorithm based on SOMs in [5], the genetic clustering-based 
algorithm in [17], the hierarchical SOM-based algorithm in [18], the bagged C5 algorithm in [19], the offline 
Adaboost-based algorithm in [39], the Mercer kernel ART algorithm in [8], our algorithm using decision stumps 
and the traditional online Adaboost, and our algorithm using online GMMs and our online Adaboost. The 
Mercer kernel ART algorithm in [8] and our algorithms are online learning algorithms and the others are offline 
learning algorithms. From the table, the following useful points are deduced: 
 Overall, the detection accuracies of the online Adaboost-based algorithms are comparable with those of 
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the other algorithms. 
 Compared with the offline algorithms, our algorithms not only gain satisfactory detection rates while 
keeping low false alarm rates, but also adaptively modify the local models in online mode. This 
adaptability is very important for intrusion detection applications. 
 The detection accuracies of the online Adaboost-based algorithms are comparable with the detection 
accuracies of the Adaboost-based algorithm in batch mode. 
 Our online Adaboost-based algorithms outperform the online algorithms in [8]. In particular, lower false 
alarm rates are obtained. 
 The detection accuracy of the algorithm using decision stumps and the traditional online Adaboost is 
lower than the algorithm using online GMMs and our proposed online Adaboost. The reason for this is 
that the algorithm based on GMMs models online the distribution of each type of attacks and also 
updates the weak classifiers in a more effective way, which obtains more accurate weights for the weak 
classifiers. 
Table 9. Comparison between algorithms tested on the KDD CUP 1999 data set 
Algorithms Detection rate False alarm rate 
Offline 
Clustering [3] 93% 10% 
K-NN [20] 91% 8% 
SVM [20] 91%-98% 6%-10% 
SOM [5] 89%-90.6% 4.6%-7.6% 
Genetic clustering[17] 79.00% 0.30% 
Hierarchical SOM [18] 90.94%-93.46% 2.19%-3.99% 
Bagged C5 [19] 91.81% 0.55% 
Offline Adaboost [39] 90.04-90.88% 0.31-1.79% 
Online 
Mercer kernel ART [8] 90.00-94.00% 2.9-3.4% 
Our algorithm(decision stumps+traditional Adaboost) 90.13% 2.23% 
Our algorithm(Online GMMs+our Adaboost) 90.61-91.15% 1.17-1.69% 
 
Moreover, Brugger and Chow [50] have assessed the performance of the Snort algorithm, a typical pattern 
matching-NIDS, on the DARPA 1998 dataset which is the dataset of the raw data of the KDD CUP 1999 dataset. 
It is shown that Snort has a very high alarm rate. The results of the Snort algorithm are less accurate than those 
of the machine learning algorithms listed in Table 9. 
Our online Adaboost-based algorithms are implemented on a Pentium IV computer with 2.6GHZ CPU and 
256M RAM, using MATLAB 7. The mean training time for our algorithm with decision stumps and the 
traditional online Adaboost is only 46s and that for our algorithm with online GMMs and our online Adaboost is 
65 minutes, using all 494,021 training samples. This is an empirical demonstration that the computational 
complexity of our algorithm with decision stumps and the traditional online Adaboost is relatively low, due to 
very simple operations for the decision stumps. The computational complexity of our algorithm with online 
GMMs and our online Adaboost is moderate. In [46], the least training times required for the SOM and improved 
competitive learning neural network are, respectively, 1057s and 454s, only using 101,000 samples for training. 
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The bagged C5 algorithm [19, 47] took a bit more than a day on a machine with a two-processor ultra-sparc2 
(2~300Mhz) and 512M main memories. The RSS-DSS algorithm [35] requires 15 minutes to finish the learning 
process on a 1 GHz Pentium III laptop with 256M RAM. In [4], 8 minutes are taken for processing the training 
data in an eight-node cluster, where each node has dual 1GHz Pentium III processors and 1GB memory, running 
Red Hat Linux7.2, while 212 minutes are taken for the algorithm in [48]. The mean training time for the offline 
Adaboost is 73s [39]. 
5.2. PSO and SVM-based global models 
The proposed distributed intrusion detection algorithm is tested with 6 nodes. The KDD CUP 1999 training 
dataset is split into six parts and each part of data is used to construct a local detection model in a detection node. 
In this way, the size of training data in each node is small, with the result that accurate local intrusion detectors 
cannot be found in some nodes. In each node, a global model is constructed using the six local models. 
To simulate a distributed intrusion detection environment, the four kinds of attacks: neptune, smurf, 
portsweep and satan in the KDD CUP 1999 training dataset are used for constructing local detection models, as 
samples of these four kinds take up 98.46% of all the samples in the KDD training dataset. Table 10 shows the 
training sets used for constructing the global models in the 6 nodes. It is seen that the sizes of the training sets are 
comparatively small. Node 1 has not the portsweep and satan attack samples; Node 2 has not the satan samples; 
and Node 3 has not the portsweep attack samples. Table 11 shows the test set used in all the nodes. 
Table 10. The training sets in the 6 nodes 
Nodes 
Attack types 
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6 
Neptune 5000 1000 1000 3500 2500 1500 
smurf 5000 1000 1000 3500 2500 1500 
portsweep 0 8000 0 1500 2500 3500 
satan 0 0 8000 1500 2500 3500 
Nomal 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 
 
Table 11. The test set in each node 
neptune smurf portsweep satan Normal 
58001 164091 10413 15892 60593 
 
In the experiments, the inertia weight w in (37) varies from 1.4 to 0.4, according to the following equation: 
( 0.4) 0.4
Titer Iter
w w
Titer

                             (40) 
where Titer  is the predefined maximum number of iterations and Iter  is the current iteration number. 
Tables 12 and 13 show, using our algorithm with decision stumps and the traditional online Adaboost and 
our algorithm with online GMMs and our online Adaboost respectively, the detection rates and false alarm rates 
of the local models and those of the PSO and SVM-based global models, as well as those obtained by combining 
the local models using the SVM algorithm, the sum rule, and the majority vote rule. From the tables, the 
following three points are deduced: 
 It is seen that, overall, our PSO and SVM-based combination algorithm greatly increases the detection 
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rate and decreases the false alarm rate for each node after the local models with only a small number of 
parameters are shared. 
 In node 2, the detection rate of the PSO-SVM method is slightly less than the detection rate of the local 
model, but the false alarm rate of the PSO-SVM method is much less than the false alarm rate of the 
local model. In node 4, the alarm rate of the PSO-SVM method is slightly more than the alarm rate of the 
local model, but the detection rate of the PSO-SVM method is higher than the detection rate of the local 
model. Thus, the PSO-SVM method is more accurate than the local models in nodes 2 and 4. 
 Our PSO and SVM-based algorithm is superior to the SVM algorithm, the sum rule and the majority 
vote rule for combining local detection models. The performance disparities between different local 
models ensure that the sum rule and the majority vote rule are not suitable for distributed intrusion 
detection. The SVM may not find the optimal local model combination to improve the performance. 
Through dynamically combining a small portion of the local models to obtain the global model, our PSO 
and SVM-based algorithm effectively chooses the optimal local model combination, reduces the time 
consumption for detecting intrusions, and then achieves a better performance. 
Table 12. The results for the 6 local detection nodes using our algorithm with decision stumps and the traditional online Adaboost 
Methods Performance Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6 Average 
Local 
model 
Detection rate 99.48% 99.96% 99.98% 97.01% 97.13% 99.96% 98.92% 
False alarm rate 24.07% 9.64% 18.45% 0.42% 0.49% 8.28% 10.23% 
PSO-SVM 
Detection rate 99.59% 99.70% 99.67% 99.78% 99.65% 99.74% 99.69% 
False alarm rate 0.38% 0.44% 0.43% 0.44% 0.41% 0.48% 0.43% 
SVM 
Detection rate 99.76% 99.78% 97.13% 99.78% 99.78% 97.13% 98.89% 
False alarm rate 0.44% 0.44% 0.42% 0.44% 0.45% 0.42% 0.44% 
Sum rule 
Detection rate 99.96% 99.96% 99.96% 99.96% 99.96% 99.96% 99.96% 
False alarm rate 1.98% 1.98% 1.98% 1.98% 1.98% 1.98% 1.98% 
Majority 
vote 
Detection rate 99.96% 99.96% 99.96% 99.96% 99.96% 99.96% 99.96% 
False alarm rate 7.95% 7.95% 7.95% 7.95% 7.95% 7.95% 7.95% 
 
Table 13. The results for 6 local detection nodes using our algorithm with online GMMs and our online Adaboost 
Methods Performance Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6 Average 
Local 
model 
Detection rate 96.19% 33.66% 33.9% 99.72% 99.82% 33.77% 66.18% 
False alarm rate 0.35% 0.39% 0.56% 0.34% 0.37% 0.40% 0.40% 
PSO-SVM 
Detection rate 99.61% 99.64% 99.89% 99.84% 99.84% 99.83% 99.78% 
False alarm rate 0.3% 0.31% 0.39% 0.35% 0.34% 0.33% 0.34% 
SVM 
Detection rate 97.46% 99.76% 99.85% 99.83% 99.84% 99.85% 99.43% 
False alarm rate 0.31% 0.35% 0.36% 0.33% 0.34% 0.34% 0.34% 
Sum 
Detection rate 99.76% 99.76% 99.76% 99.76% 99.76% 99.76% 99.76% 
False alarm rate 0.37% 0.37% 0.37% 0.37% 0.37% 0.37% 0.37% 
Majority 
vote 
Detection rate 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 
False alarm rate 0.34% 0.34% 0.34% 0.34% 0.34% 0.34% 0.34% 
 
As stated in the last paragraph of Section 4, a uniform global model can be constructed for all the local 
nodes, if small sets of samples are shared among the nodes, sacrificing the privacy of raw data. We also test the 
uniform global model using the dataset of the four kinds of attacks: neptune, smurf, portsweep and satan in the 
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KDD CUP 1999 set. The training set used for constructing the global model only contains 4000 randomly chosen 
samples, and the test set for the global model contains 284672 samples of the four types of attacks and all the 
normal samples. Table 14 shows the attack types used to train local models in each node. It is seen that each 
node has only one or two types of attack. Tables 15 and 16 show, using our algorithm with decision stumps and 
the traditional online Adaboost and our algorithm with online GMMs and our online Adaboost respectively, the 
detection rates and false alarm rates of the local models in each node and those of the PSO and SVM-based 
global model, as well as those obtained by combining local models using the sum rule and the SVM algorithm. It 
is seen that our PSO and SVM-based algorithm greatly increases the detection accuracy in each node and our 
PSO and SVM-based algorithm obtains more accurate results than the sum rule and the SVM algorithm. 
Table 14. The attack types used to train the local models in each node 
Local models Types of attack 
Node 1 Neptune 
Node 2 Smurf 
Node 3 Portsweep 
Node 4 Satan 
Node 5 neptune, smurf 
Node 6 portsweep, satan  
 
Table 15. The results of the uniform global model based on our algorithm with decision stumps and the traditional online Adaboost 
when some samples are shared among nodes 
Detection models 
Detection 
rate 
False 
alarm rate 
Local 
models 
Node 1 26.47% 0.12% 
Node 2 73.20% 0.22% 
Node 3 2.19% 0.1% 
Node 4 8.77% 0.01% 
Node 5 99.62% 0.32% 
Node 6 5.32% 0.11% 
Global model (PSO-SVM) 99.99% 1.35% 
Sum rule 9.10% 0.01% 
SVM 98.98% 1.41% 
 
Table 16. The results of the uniform global model based on our algorithm with online GMMs and our online Adaboost when some 
samples are shared among nodes 
Detection models 
Detection 
rate 
False 
alarm rate 
Local 
models 
Node 1 26.48% 0.08% 
Node 2 70.16% 0.01% 
Node 3 7.92% 0.17% 
Node 4 0.81% 0.01% 
Node 5 99.62% 0.21% 
Node 6 26.77% 1.80% 
Global model (PSO-SVM) 99.99% 0.37% 
Sum rule 26.37% 0.01% 
SVM 99.99% 0.39% 
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The distributed outlier detection algorithm in [4] has a detection rate of 95% and a false alarm rate of 0.35% 
for the KDD CUP 1999 training data set, however, the algorithm in [4] requires a data preprocessing procedure 
in which the attack data are packed into bursts in the data set. An intrusion is marked as detected if at least one 
instance in a burst is flagged as an outlier. Furthermore, the high communication cost and the need to share a 
large number of the original network data confine the application of the algorithm in [4] to network intrusion 
detection. In our proposed algorithm, no assumptions are made about bursts of attacks in the training data and no 
private data are shared among the nodes, and the only communication is the concise local model parameters. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed online Adaboost-based intrusion detection algorithms, in which decision 
stumps and online GMMs have been used as weak classifiers for the traditional online Adaboost and our 
proposed online Adaboost respectively. The results of the algorithm using decision stumps and the traditional 
online Adaboost have been compared with the results of the algorithm using online GMMs and our online 
Adaboost. We have further proposed a distributed intrusion detection framework, in which the parameters in the 
online Adaboost algorithm have formed the local detection model for each node, and local models have been 
combined into a global detection model in each node using a PSO and SVM-based algorithm. The advantages of 
our work are as follows: 1) Our online Adaboost-based algorithms successfully overcome the difficulties in 
handling the mixed-attributes of network connection data. 2) The online mode in our algorithms ensures the 
adaptability of our algorithms to the changing environments: the information in new samples is incorporated 
online into the classifier, while maintaining high detection accuracy. 3) Our local parameterized detection models 
are suitable for information sharing: only a very small number of data are shared among nodes. 4) No original 
network data are shared in the framework, so that the data privacy is protected. 5) Each global detection model 
improves considerably on the intrusion detection accuracy for each node. 
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